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Abstract 
Cloud storage services are gaining popularity due to their flexibility, elasticity, and 
support to a growing need of data storage at a very accessible price, around $0.02 per 
GigaByte (GB) each month. Thus, more and more companies and users are relying on 
cloud providers to store their files. This project will study the four main cloud storage 
providers: Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud, IBM Cloud and Microsoft’s 
Azure. After understanding how each cloud provider works, a scanning tool was developed 
to search all four providers for public objects. To make sure companies and administrators 
understand the utility of the tool, privacy settings and permissions are commented, also 
commenting how and why previous data leakage occurred. The tool has been tested and 
the results obtained show that there is a lot of sensitive data available to the public. With 
the help of the developed tool, penetration testers can help companies by making sure that 
no sensitive data is publicly available. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Advances in networking technology and an increase in the need for computing 
resources have prompted many organizations to outsource their storage and computing 
needs. This new economic and computing model is referred to as cloud computing (Kamara 
& Lauter, 2010). 
Public cloud infrastructures like AWS, Google Cloud, IBM Cloud and Microsoft’s 
Azure, help their customers by moving their data to the cloud and saving them the cost of 
building and maintaining private storage infrastructure (see figure 1). Additionally, cloud 
storage provides availability and reliability at a really low cost. However, there is concern 
over the confidentiality and integrity of the data stored publicly, introducing a significant 
security and privacy risk. 
 
Figure 1 Cloud storage diagram (User Profile & Data Cloud Storage, 2018) 
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1.1 What is Cloud Storage? 
Cloud storage is a cloud computing model that stores data on the Internet through 
a cloud computing provider who manages and operates data storage as a service (What is 
cloud storage | AWS, 2018). 
Cloud-storage providers offer users clean and simple file-system interfaces, 
abstracting away the complexities of direct hardware management. At the same time 
though, such services eliminate the direct oversight of component reliability and security 
that enterprises and users expect (Bowers, Juels & Oprea, 2009). 
Cloud storage is based on a virtualized infrastructure with accessible interfaces. 
Cloud-based data is stored in logical pools across disparate, commodity servers located on 
premises or in a data center managed by a third-party cloud provider. 
Using the object storage protocol “RESTful API”, a file and its metadata are stored 
as a single object and assigned an ID. In order to retrieve a file, the user needs to present 
the ID and the system will assemble the metadata and present it to the user for further use 
(Rouse, 2016). 
Data is now stored in different ways depending on the amount and the use it will 
be given to. The three main storage architectures are (Bradford, 2018): 
 File-based storage. Is the classic approach, files are given a name, tagged 
them with metadata and are then organized in folders under directories and 
sub-directories. File level storage is simple and easy to organize but finding 
such files becomes harder the more files are accumulated. 
 Block storage. A block is a raw storage volume filled with files that have 
been split into chunks of data of equal size. An operating system manages 
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the data and where to store it. Unlike file-based architectures, there are no 
additional details associated with a block outside of its address. This 
granular controls makes it higher performance than file-based storage. 
 Object storage. Data is stored in isolated containers known as objects. 
Objects are given a unique identifier and stored in a flat memory model. 
Objects can be retrieved presenting its unique ID and they can be stored on 
a local server or a remote server in the cloud. This architecture gives more 
flexibility and scalability as it allows the users to manipulate metadata to 
the users’ needs. 
 
1.2  Main Public Cloud Storage Providers 
1.2.1  Amazon Web Services 
AWS is a subsidiary of Amazon.com that provides on-demand cloud computing 
platforms to individuals, companies and governments, on a paid subscription basis. 
Subscribers are able to connect to their AWS systems at any time through the Internet. 
AWS uses S3 bucket to provide object storage through web services interfaces. 
Objects are stored into Buckets owned by an AWS account and identified within each 
bucket by a unique user-assigned key (Muñoz, 2016). Bucket names must be unique across 
all the platform and cannot contain uppercase characters or underscores. 
1.2.2  Google Cloud 
Offered by Google, Google Cloud provides cloud computing services that runs on 
the same infrastructure that Google uses internally for its end-user products, such as Google 
Search and YouTube. 
UNSECURE CLOUD STORAGE: PREVALENCE & MITIGATION  
 
4
Google Cloud stores the user’s data in a Bucket. A Bucket has three properties that 
the user specifies when creating it: a globally unique name, a location where the bucket 
and its contents are stored, and a default storage class for objects added to the bucket (How 
Google uses Node.js? | Hype.Codes, 2017). 
1.2.3  IBM Cloud 
IBM Cloud is a suite of cloud computing services from IBM. With IBM Cloud, 
organizations can deploy and access virtualized IT resources over the Internet. 
IBM Cloud Object Storage gives the object an identifying key and is stored in a 
Bucket with a unique name. This allows for highly scalable storage where the only 
information needed to retrieve the data is the name of the object and the Bucket where it is 
stored (Object Storage in the IBM Cloud, 2018). 
1.2.4  Microsoft’s Azure  
Azure is a cloud storage system that provides customers with the ability to store 
seemingly limitless amounts of data for any duration of time. Customers have access to 
their data from anywhere at any time and only pay for what they use and store (Calder, 
Wang, Ogus, Nilakantan, Skjolsvold, Mckelvie & Haridas, 2011). 
Azure Blob storage is Microsoft’s object storage solution for the cloud. Blob 
storage exposes three resources: the user’s storage account, the container in the account 
and the Blobs in the container.   
Blob storage is optimized for storing massive amounts of unstructured data, such 
as text or binary data (Introduction to Azure Storage – Cloud storage on Azure, 2018). 
 
UNSECURE CLOUD STORAGE: PREVALENCE & MITIGATION  
 
5
1.3  Cloud Storage Data Leakage 
 The increasing use of cloud storage and the amount of data that is being migrated 
to the cloud, makes cloud services a juicy target for attackers that companies and users 
have to be aware of. 
 Attackers have already set their eyes on cloud storage and have been able to get 
access to the content stored in them and obtain sensitive data containing information of 
millions of customers. 
 Big companies that work with a lot of customers and have access to a lot of private 
information are the targets of attackers. The amount of data that these companies contain 
and have to store makes them more prone to commit errors and leave information publicly 
available. 
1.3.1  Accenture Cloud Leak 
 Accenture one of the largest consulting firms left at least four cloud storage buckets 
unsecured and publicly downloadable, exposing Application Programming Interface (API) 
data, authentication credentials, certificates, decryption keys, customer information and 
more sensitive data (O’Sullivan, 2018). 
 The four AWS S3 buckets were publicly accessible and their content could be 
downloaded by anyone just by entering the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) with the 
bucket name into a web browser. The buckets were controlled by a single account 
responsible for making the content public. 
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1.3.2  Verizon Wireless Cloud Leak 
 On July 2017 personal information of about 6 million customers stored on AWS 
was leaked. In September of the same year corporate information about IT systems and 
login credentials was also leaked. 
 The first leak was caused by an employee that placed log information from 
customers on a publicly accessible S3 server. The second leak a few months later, was 
caused by an engineer that set up an insecure S3 account that contained technical 
information about the company (Chickowski, 2018). 
In both cases, the leakage was caused by human error, such as incautious users that 
did not properly understand how to work with permissions and set up the proper privacy 
settings for the data that was being stored. 
1.3.3  Booz Allen Hamilton Cloud Leak 
 Booz Allen Hamilton, a government contractor was found to have public 
information stored on the cloud on May 2017. Information that would require a Top Secret-
level security clearance from the Department of Defense was accessible to anyone looking 
in the right place (O’Neill, 2018). 
 The AWS bucket stored about 28 GB of data including credentials for a senior 
engineer, passwords to a US government system, and a half dozen unencrypted passwords 
for government contractors. 
In this case not only was information compromised, but further systems could have 
been as well. The exposed credentials could have been used to gain access to a Pentagon 
system and other government systems. 
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1.3.4  WWE Cloud Leak 
 Back in July 2017, security researchers found a publicly stored database belonging 
to the WWE. The data was stored again in a AWS S3 bucket without user-name or 
password protection. 
 The unsecured data contained customers information including names, physical 
addresses and personal information. Furthermore, another bucket contained billing address 
information and usernames for European customers (Sheridan, 2017). 
 
1.4  Understanding Permissions 
 Most of the cloud data leaks that have occurred are caused by human error, and it 
is crucial for users that privacy permissions for each provider are understood and studied. 
Every Cloud Service provider has different permissions models regarding how 
content is stored on their systems. In order for organizations to prevent data leakage, first 
it is necessary to understand how each cloud container works and deals with basic 
permissions settings. 
The following questions have to be answered to understand permissions and how 
each provider deals with the stored objects: 
 Is the bucket and/or objects public or private by default?  
 Is anonymous access granted via Command-Line Interface (CLI) and web 
browser without having to be signed into the provider? 
 Is there a setting to allow a logged in user to access the bucket but a logged 
out anonymous user would be disallowed? 
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 Is there a setting to allow a specific logged in user access to a private 
bucket? 
If the buckets are public by default, an administrator could forget to change the 
setting to private when uploading sensitive data. Private buckets by default are more secure 
but still run the risk of an administrator changing the settings to public. 
Anonymous access without being signed into the provider would allow access to 
every person on the internet that knows the name of the bucket. If this feature is available 
by default cloud storage would be unreliable as all the data stored in them would be publicly 
available. 
 Allowing registered users access to private content, is a key feature of cloud storage 
as it allows users to share large content between known and authenticated users through 
the internet without having to setup a physical storage device to a large number of users. 
 Through Access Control List (ACL) developers can grant registered users read or 
write permissions for individual buckets or objects, allowing to share files between the 
users. Another sharing option only for Azure, is through Shared Access Signatures (SAS) 
which provides a way to grant limited access to objects stored with other Azure clients 
without exposing the owner account key. 
 The following table provides information as to how the four main object storage 
providers operate (see table 1). 
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Public or Private by 
default? 
Anonymous access 
granted? 
Logged in user 
access to private 
bucket? 
AWS S3 
Bucket 
Private  When Public 
 With pre-signed 
URL 
Through ACL 
permissions granted 
Google Cloud 
Bucket 
Private  When Public 
 With pre-signed 
URL 
Through ACL 
permissions granted 
IBM Cloud 
Bucket 
Private  When Public 
 With pre-signed 
URL 
Through ACL 
permissions granted 
Azure Blobs Private When Public With Shared Access 
Signature (SAS) 
grant access 
 
Table 1 Permissions for each provider (Managing Access Permissions to Your Amazon S3 Resources - Amazon 
Simple Storage Service, 2018) (Access Control Options  |  Cloud Storage  |  Google Cloud, 2018) (Bucket permissions, 
2017) (Manage anonymous read access to container and blobs, 2017) 
 
 Even though the four main bucket providers set their object storage to private by 
default, administrators may still improperly change a bucket to public that contains 
sensitive data. A popular bucket scanning tool has been modified in order to allow 
companies and penetration testers the ability to search for these insecure public buckets. 
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Chapter 2 
Bucket Scanner 
The Bucket Scanner developed for this project is based on the Bucket Finder 1.1 
developed by Robin Wood (Wood, 2018). Wood’s Bucket Finder 1.1 has a creative 
commons attribution-share alike license which encourages modification. 
Bucket Scanner has adapted the code provided by Robin Wood by adding new 
functionality. Initially, Bucket Finder 1.1 could scan AWS S3 buckets and provide 
information about them. The new tool has added the options to additionally scan Google 
Cloud and IBM Cloud. 
The tool takes bucket names from a wordlist that the user must provide. The 
program then checks every name in the wordlist to see if the bucket exists in AWS S3, 
Google Cloud and IBM Cloud. Companies and authorized penetration testers can use 
custom wordlists made of the company’s names or product names to run through the cloud 
providers and make sure the objects stored are set to private or search for any buckets 
employees may have created without authorization. 
If there exists a bucket with a name found on the list, the tool will check if such 
bucket is public or private. Furthermore, the tool will list all files that are stored in public 
buckets and check if the files are public or private. 
 Finally, if the download option is enabled, public files found inside a public bucket 
will be downloaded into a new directory keeping the name of the bucket and files1 (see 
figure 2).  
                                                 
1  The download option should not be used to download files in a bucket without permission form the 
owner or company of the bucket 
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Figure 2 Execution of Bucket Scanner 
 
2.1 How Does the Bucket Scanner Work? 
All of the cloud providers specify that the name identifier of each bucket has to be 
unique across their cloud service. Therefore, there will be no bucket with the same name 
as another bucket in the same cloud platform. Even that the owner or the region are 
different, no bucket name will be used more than once. 
The unique identifier feature allows performing a dictionary scan through all the 
cloud infrastructure of the provider. The Bucket Scanner that has been developed performs 
a dictionary scan on each cloud provider to search for confidential data. 
To start the scanning tool, it is necessary that the user provides a dictionary 
containing a wordlist with names. These names will be used as the name of the buckets the 
tool will search for. 
Additionally, the user must choose between which of the three storage providers 
will be scanned; if no Cloud Storage is specified, the scanner will scan all three providers 
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by default. Moreover, the user can choose whether to download the public content that the 
scanner finds or just list the content inside the bucket. 
Once, the user has input the command with the necessary information for the 
system to work, the tool will start to scan for buckets. In the odd case that the user inputs 
wrong information or any of the necessary commands are not in place, the tool will notify 
the user what is wrong and display what information is required. 
To see if the bucket exists, the scanner combines the name given on the wordlist 
and combines it with the host URL of the service provider: 
  http://<end-point-url>/<bucket-name> 
 
The endpoints being: 
 http://s3.amazonaws.com for AWS S3 
 http://storage.googleapis.com for Google Cloud 
 http://s3-api.us-geo.objectstorage.softlayer.net for IBM Cloud 
In the case that the bucket is private or it does not exist, a browser would show an 
Error Code showing the problem (see figure 3 and 4): 
 
Figure 3 Error Code for Private Bucket 
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Figure 4 Error Code for non-existent Bucket 
If the tool encounters private or inexistent buckets, error codes are displayed to the 
user regarding if the bucket is private or if the bucket does not exist. 
On the contrary if the bucket is public, there will not be any error code from a web 
browser and it will additionally show the file names stored inside (see figure5). The tool 
will display this same information to the user displaying the public bucket and the 
respective file names. 
UNSECURE CLOUD STORAGE: PREVALENCE & MITIGATION  
 
14
 
Figure 5 Browser output when Public Bucket 
The tool uses the HTTP HEAD method to determine if bucket objects are public or 
private.  
HEAD requests allows meta-information in the response headers to be retrieved 
without having to download the actual content; this allows a faster way to check if a file is 
publicly available without actually downloading, or viewing the content inside the files.  
Using the HEAD request on each file in the directory list, the scanner will get a 
response either: “200 OK” or “403 Forbidden” (see figure 6). With these two responses, 
the program can enumerate if the files stored are public or private. 
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Figure 6 Error 403 trying to access Private Object 
Finally, if the user has enabled the option to download the content inside the bucket, 
the scanner will download all the public objects found and placed them in a folder with the 
name of the bucket followed by the name of the cloud provider. 
To summarize, a penetration tester hired by company X could use a wordlist that 
contains the bucket names that the company may use (company name, company product 
names, etc.) to see if the buckets are public or private. The tool will then display if the 
buckets are private or public and the content stored inside the public buckets. If the 
penetration tester is authorized by the company; they could additionally enable the 
download option and study the files that the tool retrieves from the cloud. Finally, with the 
downloaded content, the tester will determine if it should be stored publicly or need to be 
changed to private. See figure 7 for a flow diagram of the tool’s operations.   
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Figure 7 Flow diagram for Bucket Scanner 
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The following figure is an example of the output displayed to the user after running 
the tool through a short wordlist in which buckets have different privacy settings and the 
download option has been enabled (see figure8). 
 
Figure 8 Display example from Bucket Scanner 
 
2.2 Results 
One goal of this project was to perform scans against two wordlists which contained 
typical names for buckets. The results were then analyzed and broken down to see what 
types of buckets and files organizations generally explicitly set to be publicly available 
(since all three providers configure buckets to be private by default).The download option 
was disabled in both scans as we only wanted to collect the metadata of files that 
organizations chose to make public and not view or collect the content of the files 
themselves. 
The findings have been analyzed based on three steps: 1) the number of public, 
private, and not found buckets; 2) the public files and private files stored inside public 
buckets; and 3) a breakdown by the type of files that are public. 
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The first list that the tool has run through contains 1281 words with common bucket 
names that contain company names, and other random words. For the first step, the 
obtained results are listed below (see table 2): 
 
 
Total Percentage 
Scanned Buckets 3458 100% 
Public Buckets 160 5% 
Private Buckets 1573 45% 
Not Found Buckets 1725 50% 
Table 2 First scan Bucket result 
Before analyzing the buckets found, comment that not all the names on the list are 
valid bucket names therefore not obtaining 3843 buckets scanned2,3.  
As it can be seen from the table above, most of the buckets that the tool has found 
are set to private so the tool cannot access the metadata inside. However, 5% of the buckets 
are set to public meaning there are files stored inside which may contain sensitive 
information. 
Following the next step shows the amount of public and private files that have been 
found inside the previously public buckets (see table 3): 
 
 
Total Percentage 
Private Files 7909 20% 
Public Files 30921 80% 
Total Files 38830 100% 
Table 3 First scan files result 
 
                                                 
2 https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/BucketRestrictions.html  
3 https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/naming  
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Table 3 shows that only one-fifth of the bucket’s files are set to private and that the 
majority are set to be publicly accessible. 
Finally, the breakdown of the type of public files found is shown below (see table 
4): 
 
Type Extensions Total 
Images jpg|png|gif|svg|bmp 18931 
Music and Video mp4|mp3|flv|wmv|swf 3309 
Documents txt|docx|pdf|pptx|xlsx|csv 1700 
Web html|xml|js|css|json 1756 
Archives zip|rar|tar|gz|7z 1392 
Database sql|dbf|dd|DDD 53 
Runnables jar|exe 29 
Backups bak 0 
Other 
 
3751 
Table 4 First scan type of public files result 
Most of the content that is stored inside the public buckets are multimedia files that 
may be innocuous but potentially could be displaying sensitive images of customers or 
even pictures of invoices. The tool has found a large number of publicly available written 
documents, databases and archives which could potentially contain sensitive data (see 
figure 9). 
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Figure 9 First scan pie chart for file type 
 
The next list that has run through the tool, contains 1907 words that also consist of 
common names. However, this time we will break down the obtain results by their provider 
giving us a more detailed analysis on how organizations utilize the different cloud services. 
As before, the first step of the analysis shows the number of public and private 
buckets and the buckets that do not exist (see table 5). 
 
 
Amazon Google IBM Total Percentage 
Scanned Buckets 1170 1541 1907 4618 100% 
Public Buckets 75 18 3 96 2% 
Private Buckets 749 977 176 1902 41% 
Not Found Buckets 346 546 1728 2620 57% 
Table 5 Breakdown scan Bucket results 
Like the list before, this new list also contains names that are not valid for Amazon 
and Google. 
61%
11%
5%
6%
5%
0%
12%
Images Music and Video Documents Web Archives
Database Runnables Backups Other
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As the results show on table 5, Amazon buckets contain the most public buckets 
from the three providers. This result could be due to the fact that Amazon makes it easier 
for users to make the bucket public, as the user can choose that option during setup, even 
though by default the buckets are set to private.  
Additionally, IBM contains fewer buckets with the names on the list, which could 
be due to being the one that is less used or just because the names used by companies are 
not as common as with the other two providers. 
Next, the breakdown of the public and private files found inside of the public 
buckets are displayed (see table 6): 
 
 
Amazon Google IBM Total Percentage 
Private Files 2688 6150 5 8843 37% 
Public Files 12785 1422 1003 15210 63% 
Total Files 15473 7572 1008 24053 100% 
Table 6 Breakdown scan files result 
On the following results shown in Figure 10. Amazon is also the one with most 
public files stored. Based on the results, the users that rely on Google Cloud may be more 
careful with their privacy settings as less than 20% of files are stored publicly. 
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Figure 10 Breakdown scan pie chart distribution of public files by provider 
 
Also, the public files found in IBM Cloud are mainly stored inside the same public 
bucket which could indicate that a particular user was trying to explicitly share a large 
amount public of content. 
Lastly, the breakdown of the public files found by their type are displayed (see table 
7): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84%
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Amazon Google IBM
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Type Extensions Amazon Google IBM Total 
Images jpg|png|gif|svg|bmp 7114 1143 0 8257 
Music and 
Video 
mp4|mp3|flv|wmv|swf 877 0 1000 1877 
Documents txt|docx|pdf|pptx|xlsx|csv 1027 80 0 1107 
Web html|xml|js|css|json 1478 2 0 1480 
Archives zip|rar|tar|gz|7z 376 163 0 539 
Database sql|dbf|dd|DDD 41 5 0 46 
Runnables jar|exe 584 0 0 584 
Backups bak 172 0 0 172 
Other 
 
1116 29 3 1148 
Table 7 Breakdown scan type of public files result 
Breaking down the public files by type into a graph (see figure 11), makes it even 
more clear that AWS S3 is the service that stores most public data of the three providers. 
Not only does AWS contain public documents and databases, but it also contains a large 
number of backups that may contain a lot of information about companies and their users. 
 
Figure 11 Stacked bar graph for file type and provider 
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Google Cloud and IBM Cloud clearly stored fewer public objects on their cloud 
servers. For Google and IBM allowing public access to buckets and files is more complex 
that in the case of Amazon, this reduces the probability that an inexpert administrator 
changes the permissions settings to allow public access by mistake. 
 
2.3  Securing Unsecured Buckets & Other Sharing Methods 
As results have shown, there is a lot of data that is already accessible to the public. 
This constitutes a major security threat which most companies are unaware of. To prevent 
future data leakage, users and developers have to be familiar on how to configure the 
buckets to be private again and use other methods to share the content. 
 The easiest way to make all the stored content private again, would be by setting 
the permissions of the bucket to be private, thus making all the content inside private. This 
option is available through web browser and CLI for AWS and Google Cloud, while only 
through CLI for IBM. 
 In the web browser, for both providers AWS and Google Cloud, the permissions 
that are currently set for “allUsers” have to be removed. On the other hand, when using the 
CLI the owners have to first log in and after introduce the necessary commands, provided 
by the User’s Guide of each provider, that makes the bucket private again4,5,6. 
Additionally, there is another option that allows administrators to only make 
individual objects inside a bucket private again, leaving the rest available to the public. 
This option, requires going through each object and deleting the public permission. Like 
                                                 
4 https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/access-control-block-public-access.html  
5 https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/access-control/create-manage-lists#changing-acls  
6 https://console.bluemix.net/docs/services/cloud-object-storage/iam/public-access.html#allowing-
public-access   
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the option before this option is allowed through web browser and CLI for AWS and Google 
Cloud and only on CLI for IBM Cloud. 
As mentioned before, for web browser, the permissions for “allUsers” has to be 
removed and for CLI the necessary command has to be introduced. This option can be 
tedious and time consuming and for these reasons cloud storage should contemplate other 
options that allow administrators to share objects but only with other known and 
authenticated users. 
The second option requires more work as developers need to go object per object 
deleting the public access from them. To simplify this process companies should create 
public and private buckets and separate files depending on the information they stored. 
Organizations should periodically audit their public buckets to ensure no private data has 
been placed in public buckets. 
2.3.1  Other sharing methods 
Even though making the content public is the easiest way to share objects with 
others, sensitive data should only be available for trusted users. Allowing access to only a 
group of users is much more secure than giving access to everybody and prevents the use 
of scan attacks in the search of public information. 
All of the providers allow developers to give access to their contents through two 
methods: ACL, and pre-signed URL. 
Through ACL the owner of the bucket can grant access to a group of trusted users 
to its content. This way only allows logged in users to access the content. As the owner of 
the bucket has to give access to a known and registered user, it verifies that only that user 
can access the content. 
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 Additionally, ACL allows administrators to grant different levels of permissions 
so that the trusted users can not only view the content and also modify it and delete it 
(Access Control List (ACL) Overview - Amazon Simple Storage Service, 2018) (Access 
Control Lists (ACLs)  |  Cloud Storage  |  Google Cloud, 2018) (Creating Access Control 
Lists, 2018). 
On the other hand, a pre-signed URL allows to give access to the content to anyone 
that has the URL, it is not as secure as ACL because non-logged in users would also be 
able to access the object if they somehow are able to obtain the URL. These URL are a 
time limited way to share an object with others even if they are not authenticated (Create a 
pre-signed URL, 2018) (Share an Object with Others - Amazon Simple Storage Service, 
2018) (Signed URLs  |  Cloud Storage  |  Google Cloud, 2018). 
Pre-signed URL allow to easily share content between users and even that is not as 
secure as ACL, the URLs configuration is more complex than the URLs of public buckets, 
and the time limit ensures that it is only share for a short period of time. 
 
2.4  Problems Scanning Microsoft’s Azure  
 The Bucket Scanner was first thought to also be able to scan Azure’s Blobs making 
able to scan all four of the main Cloud Storage providers. 
The same permissions study was carried out for Azure to get to know its 
permissions and how to access public content that is stored inside. Turns out that objects 
are stored in a different manner than the other providers. 
The URL configuration for Azure differs from the other providers the following 
way: 
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https://<resource_name>.blob.core.windows.net/<blob_name>  
 
Users have to first create a resource and then are allowed to make Blobs inside of 
such resource, making it harder to use a dictionary scan as Blobs with the same name can 
be stored inside resources that have different names. A scanner for Azure would have to 
run through to wordlist; one with names for resources and a second list with Blobs names. 
For each resource name that the scanner would find that exists, the scanner would then 
send a request for each name on the Blob list, increasing exponentially the number of 
requests the scanner would have to do.  
 Also, when making a request the browser display does not show if the Blob exists 
or not. It just returns the Error Code “Resource Not Found” for both existent and non-
existent Blobs (see figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12 Error Code for Blobs 
 
The Error Code, makes the Bucket Scanner unable to determine if a Blob exists for 
a given name on the list. 
Microsoft’s Azure has a security advantage over the other providers as it cannot be 
dictionary scanned as easily in search of sensitive data.   
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Chapter 3 
Conclusion 
As it has been proved three of the major public cloud storage providers can be 
dictionary force scanned with the help of this tool and a word list containing typical names 
that companies would use to name their buckets. 
Even if most of the public files do not contain sensitive information, there are files 
that do contain important information that could harm users if sensitive data falls into the 
unethical hands. 
All of the cloud providers set the buckets to private by default, so it is in hands of 
the developers to change the buckets to public and then also change the content stored 
inside to also be public. 
Being able to download sensitive public data from the companies constitutes a 
major security threat that most companies are probably not aware of, as it is the cloud 
administrators that have to be careful with the files they store publicly and be sure that 
none of it could be utilized to harm the users or the company. 
Companies and administrators using public cloud providers should perform 
periodical scans and audits on their buckets to make sure that there is no bucket public that 
stores sensitive information. With the help of this scanner, companies and authorized 
penetration testers would be able to perform scans on their system and know if they are 
safe or not. Public buckets that contain sensitive data, should be changed to private access 
in order to prevent possible data leaks.  
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Additionally, cloud administrators should be trained about the different information 
they will be uploading to the cloud and making sure that they understand how to properly 
set up permissions accordingly. 
Furthermore, as all the providers have options to share the buckets with known and 
authenticated users, developers should learn and utilize those options to share the content 
when needed. Even if this option is more tedious for administrators, and requires more 
knowledge from part of all the employees, companies should encourage administrators to 
use these methods to share the content only with a few trusted users instead of making the 
content public to everyone. 
Finally, as cloud object storage becomes more and more popular, written policies 
should take care on how the data is stored and shared through the cloud to minimize the 
possible human error of making sensitive data public instead of keeping it private. 
In conclusion, cloud storage will continue to grow during the upcoming years, 
becoming a point of attack for hackers. Companies should make sure that their data is 
properly stored and not available to the public. The Bucket Scanner could be utilized as a 
tool for companies and penetration testers to search for and audit potentially sensitive data 
that may have uploaded and improperly configured to be publicly available.   
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